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Governments are turning to online self-help courts in an effort to cut costs, 
increase access to the justice system, and, in response to the global pandemic, to reduce 
physical contact. But to what extent do these courts support pro se or self-represented 
litigants? This article reports a laboratory experiment which compared how laypeople (pro 
se) and lawyers explained the same justiciable problem in a mock online court portal. Retired 
judges also evaluated a sub-set of blinded claims and provided opinions on their quality. The 
study found that the overall quality of laypeople’s claiming was lower than lawyers but there 
were outliers: both high-quality lay-filed claims and low-quality lawyer-filed claims. 
Laypeople were not as good at reporting legally salient details and showed confusion about 
corporate responsibility. When laypeople did report legally salient detail, they sometimes did 
so without a clear purpose or did so unclearly, confusing the reader. The quality of lawyer-
filed claims varied and some created overly complex claims that would be uneconomic to 
litigate. We suggest that designers of online courts can use the evidence from this 
experiment, and future research like it, to build interfaces that will assist pro se or self-







Before the global pandemic, there was already a move towards online court 
programs as governments struggled with restricted budgets and the need to increase access to 
justice. The public health challenges of the pandemic has accelerated this move, creating the 
possibility of a fundamentally reshaped justice system (Freeman Engstrom 2020). One aspect 
of the online court movement is developing systems that laypeople can access without the 
assistance of a lawyer. These systems respond to each of the three primary factors pushing 
governments to adopt online courts: saving costs (by reducing the need for state-sponsored 
subsidies to lawyers); increasing access to justice (by reducing barriers to court including 
cost, inconvenience, and fear); and protecting public health (by enabling remote filing and 
processing of court files).   
Reforms were underway before the pandemic. The most ambitious example—
with a budget of over £1 billion—is the reform of the courts of England and Wales (Hodges 
2016). This includes reform to all areas of the court system from the operation of criminal 
and family courts to redesigning the infrastructure (technological and physical) that underpins 
them (Rozenberg July 2020). An example of a more incremental approach has been the Civil 
Resolution Tribunal (CRT) of British Columbia, which features a front-end system to help 
laypeople resolve disputes without resort to lawyers (Salter and Thompson 2016). Less 
ambitious programs for online forms or filing systems designed with laypeople in mind were 
also underway before the pandemic (for overviews of online dispute resolution and online 
courts see commentary by leaders in the field including Loebl 2019, Susskind 2019, Katsh 
and Rule 2016).  
These systems are promoted as tools for increasing access to justice, but what this 
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means in practice is not always clearly articulated by those driving the reforms. The benefits 
of these systems include improving the “completeness and legibility” of claims filed by 
laypeople (Sela 2016 359), increased user satisfaction, cost reduction (for the state and the 
disputant), reduction in time to resolution, reduced need for hearings, increased rates of 
settlement, and increased litigant engagement (Byrom 2019). While these are benefits, they 
do not themselves equate to improved “access to justice”. The concept of access to justice is 
“admittedly not easily defined” but includes access to dispute resolution under the auspices of 
the state and a result that is “individually and socially just” (Cappelletti and Garth 1978, 182). 
Access to justice, as Rhode observed, is not just access to formal court process (Rhode 2004) 
but the courts are of course an important component. For courts to deliver just results a 
number of elements are required, including—importantly for our purposes—an effective 
hearing and a decision in accordance with substantive law (Byrom 2019). These elements of 
access to justice require the decision-maker and the opposing party to be in possession of all 
the law-relevant facts; without knowledge of all the law-relevant facts, an effective hearing 
and a decision in accordance with substantive law cannot be achieved.  
This, therefore, raises a question: How adept are laypeople at providing law-
relevant facts when they are elicited through an online portal? Without the assistance of 
lawyers (who are a significant cost in disputes), how do laypeople undertake the task of 
entering information about themselves, the person or entity they are in dispute with, the 
details of that dispute from their perspective, and the remedy they are seeking? This is a 
difficult question to answer. The facts of real-world disputes cannot be omnisciently known. 
Furthermore, “facts” in the real world are not fixed events simply waiting to be inputted into 
a court portal. Real-world events are transformed into legal facts through retelling, labelling, 
blaming, interacting with others, and participation in the legal process (Matoesian 2001, 
Felstiner, Abel, and Sarat 1980). Given these difficulties—and the fact these systems are new 
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innovations—testing of online court portals has tended to focus on measuring subjective user 
experiences of these systems (Cambridge Pro Bono Project 2019, 96, Sykes, Dickson, and 
Ewart 2020), rather than examining how accurate and complete laypeople’s narratives are. It 
is possible, however, to gain some insight into laypeople’s claiming by taking the dispute out 
of the real world setting and into the laboratory, where the ground truth about the facts is 
already known. That way, the important facts are known, and it is possible to test whether 
laypeople select the law-relevant information to input into an online portal. The experimental 
setting is the “best candidate when one wants to maximize control and make causal claims 
about relationships” (van Boom, Desmet, and Mascini 2018). This is what we did in this 
study. We created a justiciable dispute and a mock online court (MOC). We then recruited 
laypeople and lawyers, gave them the same information about the dispute and access to our 
MOC, and asked them to enter a claim. In doing so, we seek to provide further insights into 
how laypeople can be effectively supported to explain a dispute narrative to a court.   
In the first section of this paper, we canvas the substantial literature on the 
interaction of laypeople with the justice system for insights on laypeople’s ability to engage 
in legal claiming. Given that online court development has been significantly influenced and 
tested through “design thinking” or “human-centered design”, we also consider this literature. 
We argue that a design-based approach has been helpful to reorient court systems to meet the 
needs of laypeople but needs to be complemented by other research.  
In the second part of the paper, we turn to explaining the experiment we 
conducted to examine how laypeople, compared to lawyers, perform the task of entering a 
claim in an online court. This is the type of complementary research we envisage as being 
important to ensure online court systems deliver genuine access to justice. Although this 
paper focuses only on the accuracy of the law-relevant facts which were entered into our 
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MOC, the data produced also provides potential insights into discourse and other aspects of 
lay claiming strategies.  
Laypeople and the Courts  
The research on lay interaction with the civil justice system comes from the 
extensive work on those variously referred to as pro se, self-represented litigants, or litigants 
in person. This research examines how self-represented litigants engage with the courts, 
including the deficits in how self-represented litigants explain their cases to the court. These 
studies have found that a critical obstacle for these litigants is their “inability to state clearly 
the issues in dispute” (Dewar, Smith, and Banks 2000, 56). Moorhead and Sefton’s (2005, 
176) study found that self-represented litigants “were more likely [than represented litigants] 
to put forward cases that were entirely misconceived,” a problem that stemmed from, 
amongst other things, not understanding the purpose of litigation and struggling to identify 
legally relevant matters (Moorhead and Sefton 2005, see also Trinder et al. 2014). 
Failing to understand what should be included in a claim create difficulties for 
self-represented litigants. McKeever et al. (2018, 105) identified in their Northern Ireland 
study that self-represented litigants were unsure about how to prepare documents and what to 
include: “A recurring comment was the ‘belt and braces’ approach to statements and 
affidavits where [self-represented litigants] were unsure or were unfocussed about what to 
include, so included everything for completeness, and so produced over-long written 
submissions.” Trinder et al. (2014, 42) conversely observed that self-represented litigants 
“often filed papers … with too little … information in them” (Trinder et al. 2014, 42). They 
speculated that an explanation for very brief documents was that self-represented litigants did 
not want to engage in pre-disclosure – a requirement of court procedure – and preferred to try 
and ambush the opposing party (Trinder et al. 2014).  Keeping details to a minimum may be 
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part of this strategy or may stem from not understanding what information must be disclosed 
and therefore erring on the side of brevity.  
Self-represented litigants are also thought to struggle with the limits of what the 
judicial system can offer by way of remedies. As Cunningham has suggested: “the law has 
come to define the problems of ordinary people in ways that may have little meaning for 
them, and to offer remedies that are unresponsive to their needs as they see them” 
(Cunningham 1992, 1301). Moorhead and note that self-represented litigants did not 
understand the nature of remedies sought against them (Moorhead and Sefton 2005, 155). 
The difficulties that self-represented litigants encounter in preparing court 
documents should not be surprising. Lawyers who are well-versed in advocacy know that 
selecting details is intimately connected to the applicable law and the lawyer’s theory of the 
case. As Rose’s Pleading without Tears advises, “there is no substitute for a full-
understanding of the case itself, and the relevant law. In the absence of either of the above, 
the drafting is bound to be second-rate” (Young and Selby 2017, 11). This ability to select 
law-relevant facts is a skill that is carefully honed in legal education. In her linguistic study of 
legal education, Mertz (2007, 67) explains how law students are trained in a specific 
storytelling style where facts selected “are centered on warrants derived from layers of legal 
authority.”  
What is relevant in a story depends on what the legal authority deems relevant. 
For example, a legal narrative of an incident in a carpark might begin like this:  
On or about 25 January 2020, I drove to Target at 67 Main Road, Fairview. On 
entering the carpark from the Main Road entrance, I searched for an empty space and 
saw one in the third row. I proceeded towards the carpark but as I approached, a black 
Toyota Hilux utility (plate unknown) reversed suddenly.  
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This story includes particular details that are focused on being able to lay blame 
on a particular party. Precise details about time, location, and vehicle appearance are all 
included. There is only one perspective (the storyteller’s) speaking as one witness. This is 
legal storytelling, which Matoesian (quoting Gary Goodpaster) has referred to in the context 
of an adversary criminal trial as a type of “regulated storytelling contest between champions 
of competing, interpretative stories” in which “facts are proven through a complex process of 
persuasion” (Matoesian 2001, 5). 
In contrast, Mertz explains that laypeople tell “conflict stories” which use 
“linguistic markers designed to assure listeners of the epistemological strength of speaker’s 
claim” as well as drawing on a “wealth of cultural warrants through which blame and 
responsibility are allocated, which include moral claims and emotional contexts” (Mertz 
2007, 67). Let us take the carpark story once again, but this time told as an everyday conflict 
narrative:  
People are so inconsiderate. A couple of weeks ago I was at Target and just as I was 
pulling into a park some [expletive] guy came roaring out of a park – without even 
looking – and cut me off. There was a woman standing waiting with her trolley and 
she was really angry too cos he could have hit her kid.  
This story uses various mechanisms to convince the listener that the storyteller 
has been wronged. It uses a general scene setting statement about “people” being 
“inconsiderate” and it uses colorful adjectives (an expletive and “roared”) for emphasis. It 
also adopts multiple perspectives – the storyteller’s and the bystander’s – to increase 
credibility. None of these devices, however, are part of legal storytelling. 
Mertz’s observations of the difference between lay and legal storytelling would 
predict that laypeople will omit pleading details that support legal warrants and instead focus 
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on details that draw on cultural warrants. In contrast, lawyers have come to possess (via their 
training) knowledge of “how to construct versions of conflict stories that can be understood 
by legal authorities and given legal effect” (Mertz 2007, 67). This is not a general skill, 
available to all who are sufficiently educated or “sharp” in their reasoning, but instead “a 
very particular, culturally laden kind of thinking” in which lawyers are the “experts in one 
profession’s specialized way of processing relevant information” (Mertz 2007, 98).  
While lawyers are trained in this form of reasoning, it does not mean that their 
skill in deploying it is consistently of a high standard. The problems that plague self-
represented litigants’ prepared work can feature in lawyer-prepared work. The problems with 
lawyer-prepared work may be under-reported as typically both qualitative and experimental 
studies have focused on investigating the bias against self-represented litigants (Quintanilla, 
Allen, and Hirt 2017, Macfarlane 2013, Toy-Cronin 2016). However, some qualitative 
studies do record the problems with lawyer-prepared claims. Studies in England have noted 
that there were “criticisms of the quality of solicitors’ paperwork” (Moorhead and Sefton 
2005, 193) and that “on the whole, initiating documents in most fully represented cases was 
thorough and complete” but an analysis of files found that solicitors’ work on these tasks was 
“not always done well” (Trinder et al. 2014, 39). Similarly, in another study about self-
represented litigants, a judge observed, “You'd be surprised how terrible some lawyers’ 
submissions are” (Toy-Cronin 2016, 736).  
Re-designing the System 
One response to the difficulties that laypeople encounter engaging with the courts 
is to reorient the system to make it more user-friendly. Court systems have long been 
regarded as “inaccessible and incomprehensible to ordinary people” (Woolf 1995, 119). What 
is required is not an upskilling of laypeople, but a court that is simplified so that it responds 
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to the people “for whom the system of civil justice exists” (Woolf 1995, 119). To develop 
these simplified courts, the legal field has increasingly looked towards “design thinking” or 
“human-centered design” (Shanahan and Carpenter 2019, Hagan 2018), methods now being 
applied across private and public organizations. As Kimbell (2011, 287) explains:  
[Designers] are seen as using an iterative process that moves from generating insights 
about end users, to idea generation and testing, to implementation. Their visual 
artefacts and prototypes help multidisciplinary teams work together. They ask “what 
if?” questions to imagine future scenarios rather than accepting the way things are 
done now. With their creative ways of solving problems, the argument goes, designers 
can turn their hands to nearly anything. Design is now central to innovation and since 
organizations … in the public sector … are under pressure to increase user 
satisfaction and effectiveness, then designers and their thinking have something 
important to offer.  
 
A system-design approach begins with a prototype and then tests it with the 
intended users. User-testing triggers a continuous cycle of design iteration, which continues 
throughout the life of the new system. For those involved in the development of the major 
online court systems, this approach is becoming a ‘new orthodoxy’ (Tomlinson 2019, 71-72). 
For example, Susan Ackland Hood, the Chief Executive Officer of HM Courts & Tribunals 
Service, has referred to needing to “keep on testing, learning and refining rapidly”, to 
following “the principle of testing and trying everything with real users to help us get it 
right”, and to developing new technologies “in partnership with and around the people who 
use them” (Acland Hood 2019). 
This design-centered approach has much to recommend it in that it reorients 
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thinking about the system to those it is intended to serve. However, it also has limitations. 
The emphasis on user experience means an emphasis on subjective assessments of procedural 
justice and satisfaction. These are not unimportant. Procedural justice contributes to citizens 
perceiving the legal process as legitimate and obeying its authority (Tyler 2006). But, people 
may subjectively assess a procedure as fair, even though it may not produce a substantively 
just outcome (Byrom 2019). Similarly, user satisfaction is a useful metric but “is only one of 
several values which are important to a properly functioning court and tribunal system” 
(Moorhead, Sefton, and Scanlan 2008, 2). The “pursuit of satisfaction” needs to be balanced 
“with the other desirable needs of the justice system such as predictability, efficiency and the 
delivery of just outcomes” (Moorhead, Sefton, and Scanlan 2008, 2). 
The field of dispute system design, which began from examining dispute 
resolution systems within organizations (Costantino and Sickles Merchant 1996), encourages 
careful articulation of the goals of the system being developed (Amsler, Martinez, and Smith 
2020). The goals of an online court must go beyond subjective experiences of the users and 
focus on whether the design can achieve an effective hearing and a decision in accordance 
with substantive law. A key element of reaching these goals is that the system must elicit the 
law-relevant facts. All parties must “present the information necessary to enable a decision 
maker to make a determination based on applying the law to the facts of the case and that the 
decision maker is able to comprehend this information” (Byrom 2019, [9.1]). 
In addition to the claim informing the decision maker of the relevant facts, it 
should also persuade the opposing party. As Rose’s Pleading without Tears advises, the 
claim is a chance to stamp your “authority” on the case. When confronted with a well-drawn 
claim opposing counsel might reconsider “the wisdom of proceeding with the action” and 
“see if a ‘deal’ could be done” (Young and Selby 2017, 9).  
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The complexity and importance of accurately entering a claim is, however, often 
brushed over in discussions about online courts. It is assumed that with a plain language, 
user-friendly interface, disputants can perform this task online, even though many laypeople 
struggle to do this on paper. It is also assumed that the facts are simply sitting there, waiting 
to be entered, and that writing them into an online court portal is a neutral, objective activity. 
This is contrary to the nature of a conflict story, however, which as Conley & O’Barr have 
observed, “does not exist fully developed on its own, but only emerges through a 
collaboration between the teller and a particular audience” (Conley and O'Barr 1990). In the 
case of an online portal, the teller interacts with the interface, and the portal therefore acts as 
a collaborator. Inherent in any interface are various features that allow, encourage, and 
constrain user actions to various degree, together referred to as the “choice architecture” 
(Thaler, Sunstein, and Balz 2013). For example, some actions are allowed but require time 
and effort (such as filling in a text box) and others are easy but necessary (making a selection 
from a pre-populated list before being able to move to the next page). The interface will, 
therefore, have an important role in shaping the narrative that is ultimately told.  
At this point, some online courts proponents will point out that the integration of 
dispute resolution processes into the online court interface means that the original framing of 
the dispute is unimportant. Some online court designs have an intermediary who will assist 
the parties in clarifying the facts and negotiating a resolution. If it is all going to be 
negotiated and discussed, then why bother trying to convert a lay dispute narrative into a 
legal one? Why not just let people talk? The problem is that the quality of the initial 
information is important; there is a real risk that if a claim is poorly drafted it will be 
dismissed (Sela 2016, 357-358). The court – whether a judge or someone employed to assist 
with a resolution process – has no omniscient standpoint. They can only know what they are 
told and, therefore, the information inputted matters. The quality of what is inputted also 
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matters for more pragmatic, fiscal reasons. If the court has to engage in refining a lay conflict 
narrative into a legal one, the promised cost savings start to look elusive. This is illustrated by 
Trinder et al.’s discussion of the role of “third party (quasi) lawyers” in family court disputes. 
These third parties included people acting in facilitative roles, such as children’s lawyers, 
who worked with the parties out of court in attempting to reach an agreement, as well as 
identifying the parties’ positions and presenting those to the judge (Trinder et al. 2014, 118). 
This is a real-world analogue to an online court facilitator. The authors noted that while this 
use of third parties “could be a very effective model … if pursued as a formal strategy” it 
would require more resources to support the appointment of these third parties (Trinder et al. 
2014, 118). The role of a facilitator in an online court could be an effective way to refine 
claims, but it is resource intensive. The goal of an online court should still be to, as much as 
possible, help people to explain their claim accurately. “It is a false economy for cases to 
begin and proceed with pleadings mispremised” (Kós March 2016, [47]). 
Therefore, in addition to design-thinking, user-testing orientations, we need a 
method to see how laypeople select facts and prepare a claim. This can help designers create 
court portals that maximize law-relevant information so that both the opposing party and 
decision-maker are well informed and that realize the promise of cost saving for the user and 
state provider.  
METHOD 
We designed and implemented a laboratory study to test how people interact with 
an online court portal. It is only through a laboratory study that we can gain the omniscient 
view of the facts. In the real world, the true facts cannot be known, but in a laboratory study 
we control the facts and can therefore measure which facts people select for inclusion in a 
claim, how they discuss them, and what they omit. We recruited both laypeople and lawyers 
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so we could compare the performance of the two groups. This also enables us to consider the 
strength of lawyers’ claims as being a necessary assistant to court proceedings.  
We developed a mock online court portal (MOC) based on British Columbia’s 
CRT Loans and Debts Dispute Resolution Portal, as it was at the time when we began the 
research in May 2018 (it has since been altered). Using Qualtrics software, we mimicked the 
same questions and branching logic to develop a replica.1 
The question about how well laypeople versus lawyers perform this task requires 
both quantitative and qualitative analysis. Some aspects can be measured quantitatively – the 
presence or absence of certain elements in the claim – and for these aspects we developed 
three hypotheses which we tested through quantitative analysis. Other aspects of the task – 
the way in which elements of the justiciable problem are explained in the portal – are only 
identifiable through qualitative analysis. We thus use both quantitative and qualitative 
analysis to answer our central research questions: Do lawyers perform the task of claiming 
better than laypeople? If so, with the user-friendly MOC’s assistance, will laypeople be able 
to perform the task as well as lawyers?   
The three hypotheses that we tested through quantitative analysis are as follows: 
1. That laypeople will name the same number of parties as lawyers. The fact pattern has 
three possible parties but there is only a strong legal claim against one. For the other 
two parties to be liable there would need to be a more complex argument involving 
agency and/or a constructive trust and there are not enough facts to support this. As 
laypeople will not understand the limits of these arguments—but would know from 
the fact pattern that they are part of the story—we might expect that they will name 
more parties than lawyers. However, laypeople may not understand that they can 
name multiple parties in a claim. We have therefore predicted there will be no 
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difference between the two groups. 
2. That lawyers will include more legally relevant details than laypeople when drafting 
their claims. The review of the literature suggests that laypeople will select different 
facts for inclusion in a claim, omitting legally relevant facts, and selecting facts that 
support a lay conflict narrative.  
3. That there will be a bimodal distribution in claim length among laypeople, who will 
write claims that are both much shorter and much longer than claims prepared by 
lawyers. This is also based on the literature that suggests laypeople are either overly 
brief or excessively inclusive in drafting their claims. 
In addition to quantitatively testing these three hypotheses, we also engaged in a 
qualitative analysis of the participants’ clarity of reporting detail and the use and purpose of 
certain types of detail. 
The Justiciable Problem 
With the help of two civil litigators, we designed a fictional dispute, with the aim 
of conveying a realistic legal problem that was also suitable for the laboratory. The dispute 
centered on a loan dispute between twin siblings, Jake and Amy. Jake advanced two loans to 
Amy, neither of which she repaid. The first was $20,000 to establish a food truck company 
(“Loan One”). The food truck company (“the Company”) had the potentially offensive name 
“AfroEatz”, a fact of some importance to a potential counterclaim by Amy against Jake. The 
terms of Loan One were set out in a written contract, witnessed by a neighbor, and Loan One 
was repayable within a year. Amy also agreed to repay the bank fees of $850 that Jake 
incurred in breaking his term deposit to access the funds. The second loan was advanced 
several months after Loan One, and was for $5,500 to purchase goods for the Company 
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(“Loan Two”). Loan Two was repayable in three months along with $1,000 interest and 25 
percent of the shareholding in the Company. The date for repayment of both loans had passed 
and no repayment had been received, despite Jake’s demands for payment. Amy claimed that 
she had no money, that Jake had caused reputational harm to the Company, and that Loan 
Two was a gift, not a loan. Jake had discovered that Amy had incorporated the Company but 
the registered shareholders were Amy (50 percent) and her boyfriend Mark (50 percent). 
Jake’s relationship with his sister had completely broken down and Jake was asking for help 
filing his claim to recover what he was owed. 
We conveyed information about the dispute to the participants through a written 
bundle of information and through an interview with “Jake”, played by a confederate. The 
written bundle of information was designed to communicate the dispute in a realistic way and 
included emails with a narrative of the dispute, Facebook Messenger and text messages, a 
dated written contract between the siblings, a bank statement, and a Companies Office 
record. During the interview with the confederate, further detail was disclosed, including 
dates and further documentation. We refer to this information collectively as the “fact 
pattern”. All participants received all the information in the fact pattern.  
Participants 
We recruited 67 participants from two populations: laypeople (members of the 
community with no legal training) and qualified New Zealand lawyers. A summary of the 
profile of the two groups appears in Table 1. We recruited 38 lay participants from the 
Dunedin community, a medium-sized New Zealand city with a university. We did not 
advertise on campus, however, as we wanted a representative lay population and we therefore 
recruited using Facebook advertisements. We excluded all volunteers who were past or 
present law students and anyone with any legal qualifications. Seventeen lay participants had 
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had some previous involvement with the New Zealand justice system (e.g. as disputants or 
witnesses in Family Court proceedings, employment mediations, tenancy disputes), but no 
participants had any involvement with a case similar to the factual pattern, so were all 
included in the final sample. 
The 29 lawyer participants were recruited by way of advertisements and 
approaches to personal contacts in the legal profession. To participate, the lawyer must have 
been admitted to practice law in New Zealand and have three-years post qualification 
experience (PQE) in any type of litigation. We strictly adhered to these criteria which made 
recruitment more difficult but protected the findings against interpreting any deficiencies in 
the lawyers’ claims as caused by inexperience. The participants had a range of experience, 
with 55 percent of the lawyers having more than 10 years PQE and two lawyers carrying the 
senior rank of Queen’s Counsel. 
Experimental Procedure for Lay Participants 
Lay participants completed the procedure during a laboratory session that lasted 
for approximately three hours and was audio and video recorded. The laboratory session 
included a meet and greet with an explanation of how the session would proceed. Participants 
were told we were interested in how laypeople could help other individuals to file a claim in 
court; specifically, we were asking them to help Jake who had a dispute with his sister, and 
he wanted help to prepare his claim. The participants were deceived to increase the likelihood 
that they would be more engaged and invested in the experiment.  The session then 
proceeded as follows: participants filled out a questionnaire to collect demographic 
information; participants then reviewed the bundle of written materials for up to 30 minutes 
(as needed; all participants finished their review before the 30 minutes expired); interviewed 
the confederate; and finally, entered the claim into the MOC. After they completed all the 
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steps the participant was fully debriefed and told the true purpose of the experiment, that the 
dispute was fictional, and the confederate was playing the role of a ‘mock client’. The 
experimenter explained to the participant the aims of the study and why deception was 
necessary. The participant was invited to ask any follow up questions about the process and 
aims of the research generally. At the conclusion of the debrief procedure, the experimenter 
gave the participant NZD $60 as reimbursement for expenses incurred. 
Experimental Procedure for Lawyer Participants 
The procedure for lawyer participants differed in two main ways to the lay 
participant procedure. First, we did not attempt to deceive the lawyers about the true nature of 
the study as lawyers are required to identify clients and enter into a written retainer before 
advising them. Second, lawyers did not attend in-person but participated remotely. This was 
because we would not have been able to recruit enough participants locally or to secure so 
much in-person time.  
The procedure was otherwise the same as for lay participants but modified to be 
delivered remotely. As with the lay participants, the time allocated was three hours and there 
was a demographic questionnaire. However, the questionnaire was administered at the time 
the lawyer gave their consent to participate (electronically) rather than at the beginning of the 
experiment. The experiment began, as it had with lay participants, with the lawyer receiving 
the bundle of written information but this was provided via email. Once the lawyer had 
reviewed this material, they then called the confederate via video conferencing (Zoom) and 
conducted the interview. At the conclusion of the interview, the lawyer received a link to the 
MOC and filled out the claim. After the lawyer had completed the claim, they were 
automatically redirected to another screen. That screen contained further information to 
debrief the lawyer about the purpose of the project. Our contact details were provided and the 
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lawyer was invited to arrange a time to ask any follow-up questions about the procedure and 
aims of the research generally. Finally, the lawyer was invited to provide their contact details 
so that we could send to them a NZD $50 book voucher as reimbursement for expenses 
incurred. 
Using Judges to Assess Claims  
To supplement our own analysis of the data, we recruited four retired members of 
the New Zealand judiciary who had previously presided over civil court matters to assess a 
set of claims. The judges were not provided with any compensation for their participation. 
We sought both qualitative comments and reactions to the claims and asked them to rate each 
claim’s quality using a Likert scale. 
We compiled a workbook of 12 of the claims generated in the MOC to send to 
them. We were only able to provide this smaller sample of claims as the judges were 
volunteers and there was a significant amount of reading in the small sample; we needed to 
keep the request reasonable to secure their participation. To select the lay claims, one 
author read through the “what happened” response and grouped the responses by length and 
by appearance of legal style (use of headings, prominent use of dates, particular legal 
terminology, defined terms). The other author then took one file from each of the categories 
to include in the sample i.e. long and not legal style; medium and not legal style. To select 
lawyer claims, a sample of five with differing styles in terms of length and approach were 
selected. Once in the workbook, the claims did not state whether they were by a lawyer or a 
lay person. The workbook had a wide right-hand margin for comments and at the end of each 





The quantitative and qualitative analyses were undertaken separately but in 
dialogue, with preliminary findings of one type then investigated with the other type. The 
combination of both quantitative and qualitative content analysis was designed to provide 
greater insight than what could be derived from only one form of analysis (Oleinik 2011).   
Quantitative Content Analysis 
The quantitative coding procedure was modelled on research that uses controlled 
laboratory studies to investigate the accuracy of memory reports (see for example Zajac and 
Hayne 2003). The participants’ responses (their “claims”) were extracted from the MOC, and 
then coded by two experimenters. For the lay participant data, the full dataset was 
independently coded by two experimenters. Intercoder agreement was 95 percent. For the 
lawyer participant data, a subset of the sample was independently coded by two 
experimenters (17 percent). Intercoder agreement was 92 percent. We computed a Cohen’s 
kappa coefficient using IBM SPSS Statistics for Mac, Version 26.0 to assess the reliability of 
the coding. For the details reported by laypeople, the kappa statistic ranged from moderate 
(0.50) to almost perfect (1.00) with the majority being almost perfect (1.00). For the details 
reported by lawyer participants, the kappa statistic ranged from moderate (0.44) to almost 
perfect (1.00), again with the majority being almost perfect.2 Any discrepancies in the coding 
were discussed by the experimenters and resolved through consensus. 
To determine whether participants understood the dispute generally, and the 
broader legal issues, we coded the details they provided using a checklist of narrative details. 
There were nine items on the check list, so the participant could receive a maximum score of 
nine. The experimenter reviewed the entire claim for evidence of the nine dispute narrative 
details, and coded the details using a binary scheme. If the detail was reported, they were 
awarded one point. If the detail was omitted they were not awarded the point. For example, if 
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the participant explained that Jake gave Amy some money to start a company but never 
specified the sum (i.e. $20,000, one of the nine key details), the participant would not be 
awarded the one point for having reported that key narrative detail.  
In addition to coding according to the narrative checklist, we coded the party or 
parties the participant elected to bring the claim against: the sibling (Amy); the Company; the 
partner (Mark); or any combination of all three. 
We also coded for inclusion of 70 details regarding Loan One and Loan Two (see 
Table 2 for summary). Law-relevant dispute details were identified by the two civil litigators 
who had helped construct the claim. This was coded using a ternary coding scheme to take 
into account ambiguous reporting of a details. If the detail was explicitly reported, the 
participant was given two points. If the detail was unclearly reported, the participant was 
given one point. If the detail was not reported at all, the participant was given no point. 
Qualitative Content Analysis 
The qualitative analysis was conducted using NVivo and was a form of 
qualitative content analysis (Graneheim, Lindgren, and Lundman 2017, 29). The procedure 
compared the responses to each question in the MOC, looking for similarities and differences 
in the mode of expression and information between participants, and between participant 
groups (lawyer versus lay). For each question, a series of codes was developed to reflect any 
observations about style (syntax, tense, direct or indirect demand) as well as the content. For 
example, the question which required a one sentence summary of the dispute was coded for 
syntax (sentence fragment, simple sentence, complex sentence, more than one sentence) and 
for content (mentions family relationship, mentions loans, no mention of loan). Linked to the 
code was a memorandum to record observations and insights about the data and how these 
linked to the literature. 
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The judicial evaluation data on the 12 claims was collated in a spreadsheet. This 
enabled identification of similarities and differences in their reactions to the claims.  
RESULTS 
Hypothesis 1 - Selecting Parties 
The first hypothesis concerned selecting the defendant or defendants to the 
proceeding.  Identifying the parties is the critical first step in filing any claim in court. If the 
claimant does not correctly identify the person(s) or organization(s) that owes the legal duty, 
the proceeding will not succeed; conversely, incorrectly identified parties will have to bear 
the cost of responding to the proceedings, even though they have no liability.  
The hypothesis was that there would be no difference in the number of parties 
laypeople and lawyers named in the proceeding. As the data was not normally distributed, we 
have conducted non-parametric analyses. A Mann-Whitney U test supported our hypothesis, 
and demonstrated that there was no significant difference between the number of parties the 
lawyers (Mdn = 2.00) and laypeople (Mdn = 1.00) named; U = 450.0, z = -1.40, p = .161, r = 
-.171. As with any small sample it is possible that the difference between the medians would 
become statistically significant if the sample was bigger. 
Although there was no difference in the number of parties named, we conducted 
exploratory analyses to investigate whether there was any difference as to who the 
participants named. In the fact pattern, Amy was the borrower so she should have been 
named as the first respondent. However, there were two other possible parties: the Company, 
and Mark (co-director of the Company and 50 per cent shareholder in the Company). Amy 
told Jake that Loan One was to enable her to set up and run the Company and Loan Two was 
for expenses related to this business. It was possible to make an argument that Amy was 
acting as an agent for the Company when she accepted the loans, or at least when she 
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accepted Loan Two. This would be a difficult legal argument, however, as there was nothing 
in the facts that strongly supported her acting as an agent for the Company, and the Company 
was not incorporated until after Loan One was advanced. The Company could be included for 
strategic reasons (e.g. to encourage settlement by drawing the company in to the proceeding), 
but there was no strong legal foundation for the claim. Similarly, there was nothing in the fact 
pattern that suggested Mark was liable, or at what point he was even aware of the loans. The 
only conversation Jake had with Mark was after Amy failed to repay the loans. In that 
conversation, Mark said the loans were to Amy, not the Company. There was nothing in the 
fact pattern to establish a claim against Mark in his personal capacity and he should not, 
therefore, be named. Therefore, who is named as a party has important legal implications. 
All of the participants named Amy as a party to the proceeding. However, 65.5 
percent of lawyers and 44.7 percent of laypeople also named Mark or the Company as a party 
to the proceeding. We investigated whether there were any differences across groups in 
naming Mark or the Company. As we have a small sample, we have reported the Fisher exact 
test. These analyses indicated that a small number of participants in both groups named Mark 
as a party (p = .25); whereas a larger number – and significantly more so for lawyers – named 
the Company as a party (p = .007, φ = .337) (see Table 3). 
By looking at which parties were included in the claim, we have developed 
hypotheses that warrant further investigation in subsequent research. A small percentage of 
laypeople and lawyers brought Mark into the proceeding. It is possible that these participants 
did not understand that Mark could not be personally liable; or his liability had to clearly be 
linked to the company. This suggests limited understanding of corporate law, an issue we 
discuss further below. Lawyers more often brought the Company into the proceeding. A 
plausible explanation for the lawyers’ claiming behavior was that these participants were 
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seeking a strategic advantage by involving a company, or adopting a strategy that would 
spread the liability across multiple parties.  
The judicial evaluators were critical of both the laypeople and lawyers for naming 
the Company and Mark but then failing to plead how they were liable. Where a connection 
was created to plead liability of the Company or Mark, the judicial evaluators were still 
critical. In the MOC section for remedies, one lawyer said, “I want the court to find there is a 
constructive trust over the profits”. One judicial evaluator noted “no legal basis for pleading 
this claim” and another said “for a claim of this size, an unnecessary complication”. The 
preferred approach, from the judicial evaluator’s perspective, was to only claim against Amy.  
Hypothesis 2 - Detail Selection 
The second hypothesis was that lawyers would include more law-relevant detail 
than laypeople. To assess the content that lawyers and laypeople included in the claim, we 
first examined the dispute narrative details. As the data was not normally distributed, we have 
conducted non-parametric analyses. A Mann-Whitney U test demonstrated that there was a 
significant difference between the groups, with lawyers (Mdn = 9.00) reporting a higher 
number of narrative details relative to laypeople (Mdn = 7.00), U = 150.50, z = -5.34, p < 
.001, r = -.653. Similar findings were observed between the dispute details, with lawyers 
(Mdn = 44.00) again including a higher number of relevant details in the claim compared to 
laypeople (Mdn = 27.00), U = 207.00, z = -4.356, p < .001, r = -.532. This finding supported 
our hypothesis that lawyers would include more law-relevant details than laypeople.  
The fictional dispute included varying levels of legal complexity. Most notably, 
Loan One was set out in a written contract, whereas Loan Two was a verbal contract. It is 
possible that the difference in reporting of dispute details emerged because laypeople did not 
think that the verbal contract was enforceable and, therefore, did not plead it. To see whether 
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that could explain the difference, we conducted exploratory analyses to look at the loans 
separately. Wilcoxon signed-rank tests indicate that there was a difference in the inclusion of 
law-relevant details across the loans. Both laypeople: W = 79.00, z = -3.744, p < .001, r = -
.607 and lawyers: W = 39.50, z = -3.733, p < .001, r = -.693 reported a higher number of law-
relevant details for Loan One, as compared to Loan Two. Both groups were better at 
identifying the legally-relevant details from Loan One (see Table 4). 
However, lawyers still outperformed laypeople in including law-relevant details. 
A Mann-Whitney U test demonstrated that lawyers reported a higher number of law-relevant 
details, relative to lay people, for both Loan One: U = 252.00, z = -3.790, p < .001, r = -.463; 
and Loan Two: U = 188.00, z = -4.600, p < .001, r = -.562 (see Table 4). These analyses 
confirmed that the overall differences did not simply emerge because there were two different 
loan types. Although laypeople did report significantly less of the Loan Two details 
compared to Loan One, so too did the lawyers. 
Hypothesis 3 - Length of Claim 
Our third hypothesis was that there would be a bimodal distribution for claim 
length among laypeople who will prepare very long or very short claims. Laypeople used a 
median of 142 words (range = 11 – 945 words) in the descriptive textbox to describe the 
narrative; lawyers used a median of 235 words (range = 73 – 528 words). This was a 
statistically significant difference, U = 353.00, z = -2.506, p = .012, r = -.306, but with only a 
medium effect. 
However, this difference could not tell us whether laypeople behaved as we 
hypothesized (i.e. significantly shorter and longer claims), so next we investigated if the 
distributions differed. The lawyers’ length of claim was normally distributed: W(29) = .948, 
p = .161; but this was not the case for the laypeople: W(38) = .712, p < .001. Closer 
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inspection revealed that laypeople’s claims were positively skewed – that is, more laypeople 
prepared much shorter claims. With this sample, the hypothesis that there would be a bimodal 
distribution in laypeople’s claim length was not supported.  
We conducted exploratory analyses to investigate whether the length of claim had 
any relationship with the completeness of the claim. We used a non-parametric correlational 
test for the laypeople as the length of claim was not normally distributed. Kendall’s Tau-b 
correlation revealed that there was a moderate positive correlation for the laypeople: Tau-b 
(36) = .475, p < .001. Whereas, there was a strong positive (Pearson) correlation for the 
lawyers: r(27) = .787, p < .001 (see Figure 2). Increasing words did not increase inclusion of 
relevant detail at the same rate for laypeople, relative to lawyers. Laypeople tended to “cap 
out” in the amount of relevant detail they included; there was a tipping point where the more 
words they added, substantive detail was not increasing. 
This finding tends to support the idea that some law-relevant facts are simply not 
salient to laypeople. Allowing more space will not increase the number of details they 
provide. 
Brevity is generally prized in legal writing. It has institutional benefits in terms of 
time and, therefore, cost savings when filling out court forms. The judicial evaluators were, 
unsurprisingly, critical of pleadings that were long but did not use the word count to include 
legally relevant details. For example, judicial evaluators commenting on LAY14’s claim said: 
“The pleading is a general ramble that fails to limit itself to pertinent facts” and “Overloaded 
with totally irrelevant material which is quite unnecessary. Words for the sake of words. 
Tighten, cull and focus discussing”. Lawyer-pleaded claims were not immune from this 
criticism. For example, one judicial evaluator assessing LAW28’s claim said it was “full of 
unnecessary and unhelpful details of no probative value”. However, the judicial evaluators 
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were similarly critical of the very brief pleading included in the subset: “this claim identifies 
existence of loans and failure to repay but fails to give essential particulars” and “while the 
brevity is to be also applauded it is too brief; no references to written agreements of texts”. 
We did not include in the sample of claims sent to the judges the extremely brief pleadings 
that some laypeople made, so these comments did not relate to the very shortest claims. The 
judicial evaluators’ comments illustrate that length is a relevant factor for the fact-finder, and 
they are rightly reluctant to try to draw out, or construct, the necessary details from a claim. 
This suggests the importance of presenting a well-constructed claim to the fact-finder. 
FURTHER EXPLORATORY ANALYSIS 
The hypotheses are oriented to looking at the inclusion and omission of 
information and the number of words used, information that most easily lends itself to 
quantitative analysis. It is not only the presence or absence of information that is important, 
however. So too is the clarity with which the claim is expressed. In this section, we look 
more closely at the ways different types of detail were reported. This does not go as far as 
analyzing the different discourses  participants used, but we did use exploratory quantitative 
analyses, as well as qualitative content analysis, to tease out the way participants deployed 
details.   
Clarity of Reported Details 
Recall that the participants’ claims were coded depending on whether the details 
were explicitly reported, unclearly reported, or omitted entirely. We used this coding to focus 
on clarity, and investigated whether there were differences in the number of explicitly and 
unclearly reported facts in the participants’ claims. We again used non-parametric tests. A 
Mann-Whitney U test indicated that there was a significant difference between the groups, 
with lawyers explicitly reporting a greater number of facts (Mdn = 23.00) relative to 
laypeople (Mdn = 11.00), U = 130.00, z = -5.34, p < .001, r = -.652. Whereas, laypeople 
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unclearly reported a greater number of facts (Mdn = 5.00), relative to laypeople (Mdn = 
2.00), U = 191.00, z = -4.594, p < .001, r = -.561.  
 
When we compared the claims that had high numbers of unclearly reported facts 
against those with high numbers of explicitly reported facts, the difference in clarity for the 
reader was stark. Comparing LAY22 and LAW22 provides an illustrative example. LAY22 
discusses both loans together, making no distinction between the terms and consideration for 
Loan One and those for Loan Two. The claim includes the statement: “She agreed to give me 
25% of the shares” but there is no mention of what entity the shares are in and there is no link 
between the promise of shares and Loan Two. In contrast, LAW22 is explicit about all these 
facts: 
“My sister made other promises to me that caused me to make the second loan, 
including making a commitment to me to give me 25% of the shares in the company 
she was establishing for her foodtruck business”.  
This has a significant impact on the overall comprehensibility of the claim. In 
contrast, the unclear reporting of details alerts the other party and adjudicator to their 
existence, which is preferable to complete omission, but leaves questions that need to be 
answered before the claim could be considered complete. As one of the judicial reviewers 
noted “the adjudicator is left to fill in the gaps”.  
 
Use of Chronological Detail 
One type of detail—chronological detail—is worth further exploration. 
Chronological information—what Tillers and Schum (1991, 955-956) decribe as “the 
temporal locus of evidence in time”—is essential to legal reasoning, and  litigants who fail to 
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discuss facts with reference to time will produce flawed claims. We looked in closer detail at 
each group’s use of dates in their claims. In the fact pattern, there were eight important dates. 
The participants use of dates were coded as being clearly described (e.g. On 3 March 
2017…), unclearly reported (e.g. in March…), or omitted entirely. Mann-Whitney U tests 
demonstrated that lawyers (Mdn = 5.00) explicitly reported a higher number of dates 
compared to laypeople (Mdn = 1.00; U = 156.50, z = -4.788, p < .001, r = -.585); whereas, 
laypeople (Mdn = 5.00) omitted a higher number of dates compared to lawyers (Mdn = 3.00; 
U = 225.50, z = -4.155, p < .001, r = -.508). There was no group difference for unclearly 
reported dates (Lawyers Mdn = 0.00; Laypeople Mdn = 0.50; p = .124). 
It is unsurprising that laypeople would be less likely to include dates in a claim, 
as they might be considered clutter in ordinary conversation. Sequencing and precise timing 
is often important in legal argument, however. Take, for example, the chronology for events 
relating to Loan Two. Amy claims that Loan Two was a gift, not a loan (as discussed below). 
The chronology, however, shows that the terms of Loan Two were discussed before the 
money was advanced, supporting the argument it was a loan. These chronological details are 
included to strengthen Jake’s position and minimize the force of Amy’s defense.  
Deploying detail with purpose 
Including dispute details is important in that it notifies the fact finder and 
opposing party of the relevant facts. However, as discussed at the outset, a good pleading 
deploys detail strategically and advocates for the party’s position. Strategic use of detail is 
not suitable for quantitative analysis as it requires interpretation through the lens of legal 
strategy. This aspect of the investigation is exploratory and uses only qualitative analysis.  
There were distinct differences between the way lawyers and laypeople deployed 
detail in three parts of the claims: how the participants raised the possible defenses, how the 
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participants talked about prior efforts to resolve the dispute, and what the participants hoped 
to achieve if the claim was successful. We discuss these in turn. 
Raising the defense and counterclaim 
Within the fact pattern there were details about Amy’s likely responses to any 
claim that she was obliged to repay the loans. Inclusion of these details were not essential to 
create a valid claim, but they could be strategically deployed. In response to Loan One, there 
was a possible counterclaim that Jake had damaged the Company, named “AfroEatz” (“the 
Counterclaim”). This was explained in the fact pattern as follows:   
“It turns out that someone had complained about the name of the food truck (hardly 
surprising ...) to a reporter, who had then used a photo of the truck as an example of 
cultural appropriation at music festivals. Amy thinks that this was bad publicity and 
caused her to lose business. ... But I would never make a complaint”.  
In response to the claim for repayment of Loan Two, the fact pattern included a 
statement that Amy told their mother Loan Two was a gift, something that Jake “absolutely 
denies” (“the Defense”). It is not strictly necessary to raise the possibility of the Counterclaim 
or the Defense. However, it is potentially strategically useful to raise and refute possible 
defenses and counterclaims when filing a claim.  As one of the judicial evaluators noted, 
raising the defense was “Irrelevant as to liability but it does identify nature of Amy's likely 
defense”.  
Twenty percent (n = 6) of the lawyers used this strategy of identifying both the 
counterclaim and the defense. Having raised the counterclaim and defense, the lawyers then 
denied the facts underlying both. There was only one slip, where a lawyer raised the defense 
that Loan Two was a gift, but did not deny it, replying only to the counterclaim. In all other 
cases, the lawyers either raised the counterclaim and defense and gave a bare denial, or raised 
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them and denied by giving a simple statement of facts. Examples of each are as follows:  
Bare denial: “Amy has said she won't pay the $20,850.00 because she claims I have 
caused her damage to the business through some adverse publicity. I deny that I have 
done anything to damage her business. Amy says she won't pay the $6,500.00 because 
it was a gift from me which I deny” (LAW3).  
Denial with a simple statement of the facts supporting the denial: “The First 
Respondent has advised (through our mother) that she agrees the first loan was for the 
company, but that I have caused damages as she believes I made a complaint about 
the name of Afroeatz. I never made this complaint. The First Respondent has advised 
me (again through our mother) that the second loan was a gift. I deny this. I am able 
to show text messages asking for interest on the loan and a bank statement showing I 
only paid the principal, not the whole amount” (LAW13). 
In comparison, laypeople more often raised Amy’s expected responses to the 
claim: 24 per cent (n = 9) identified both the Counterclaim and the Defense in their claim; 21 
per cent (n = 8) raised only the Defense. The Counterclaim (that a media statement damaged 
the Company) is more complex than the Defense (that Loan Two is a gift), which probably 
explains why so many laypeople only raised the Defense. What was also notable was that 
having raised the Counterclaim and/or Defense, most (though not all) offered no reply or 
denial. For example:  
When they were in contact Amy said that she could not pay back $20,850.00 as she 
did not have the money and that the $5,500.00 was a gift. The $20,000.00 Amy 
refused to pay back because of supposed damages that I had caused. This is because 
she claims that I complained about the name of the food truck to a reporter and caused 
them to lose business. (LAY7) 
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To raise a possible defense and counterclaim in a notice of claim, but to offer no 
response to it, might embolden the defendant to defend the case, as well as leaving doubt in 
the mind of an adjudicator. For these reasons, it is strategically important that if a claimant 
raises a defense or counterclaim it should also offer a reply, otherwise it might be better to 
omit any mention at all (as many of the claimants did). Those that raised the Defense and 
Counterclaim, without the reply, lost a valuable advocacy opportunity. 
Discussing the failed attempt at mediation 
The MOC contained a question that related to resolution of a dispute that is not 
traditionally part of pleading a court claim: “what have you done so far to try and resolve this 
dispute?”. The fact pattern contained a number of different pieces of information that could 
have been used to answer the question. One that most participants mentioned was Jake’s 
attempt to have his mother mediate between him and his sister. The information in the fact 
pattern about the mother’s intervention was as follows: 
“Now mum becomes involved in the story. She agreed to be an ‘intervenor’ or 
‘mediator’ or something. After mum talked to Amy and Mark, she then reported back 
to me. Apparently – Amy agreed she had borrowed the $20,000 for business but was 
now refusing to repay the loan because of the “damages” that I caused. … Amy went 
on to tell mum that the $6500 I said she owed was actually a gift! Absolute rubbish! 
… Since mum got involved, I am not speaking to either Amy or Mark at all. I’m also 
pretty mad with mum, I don’t think she really helped things”.  
Some of the lawyers (n = 12, 40 percent) and a few of the laypeople (n = 7, 18 
percent) reported this as a failed attempt at mediation. For example, “My mother attempted to 
mediate a solution, but that did not succeed” (LAW10). Strategically, this is a sound 
approach as it is a statement to the court that the informal attempts at resolution have failed, 
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and the court’s intervention is now warranted. The rest of the lawyers who mentioned the 
mediation (n = 14, 47 percent), and some of the laypeople (n = 13, 34 percent), claimed it 
occurred but were not explicit about the outcome, for example "My mother has attempted to 
mediate" (LAW10) or "I have attempted to resolve this dispute by way of family intervention 
and informal mediation" (LAW19). The failure of the mediation is implied by the language 
of “attempt” and by the fact that the dispute has proceeded to court, so this is not overly 
problematic.  
There was another cohort of laypeople who mentioned the mediation (n = 14, 37 
percent), but did so in a way that created confusion about the event. This included creating 
doubt about whether the mediation had occurred at all (e.g. “I have also contacted my parents 
with the story in the effort to get them to talk to her” (LAY10)), and a lack of clarity about 
the nature of the intervention (e.g. “Mum and Dad are involved” (LAY23)). In another 
instance, the participant made an oblique reference to the Counterclaim, but provided no 
further explanation:  
Asked mum to talk to Amy and Mark as a mediator to see what could be done, instead 
was told none of the money would be coming back because of apparent “damages” to 
give the food truck a bad name (LAY4) 
This participant made no other mention of the facts related to the Counterclaim, 
so the adjudicator would be left wondering what this refers to.  
The way in which laypeople discussed the mediation information points to an 
important difference in how laypeople, as opposed to lawyers, report information. The basic 
details are reported (there is some form of intervention from the parents), but how this 
expressed is very uncertain. The details are not being reported with a clear purpose (to inform 
the court that intervention is necessary because all informal strategies are foreclosed) but 
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floated as part of a general narrative.  
Raising the assignment of shares as a remedy 
One of the key differences observed in the qualitative analysis was how lawyers 
and laypeople discussed the assignment of shares. In the fact pattern, Amy promised Jake a 
25 percent shareholding in the Company when Jake advanced Loan Two. The Companies 
Office record, included in the written materials, listed Amy and Mark as equal shareholders, 
omitting Jake. 65.5 percent of the lawyers (n = 19) requested transfer of shares as a remedy. 
This example is typical: “I want judgment that [the Company] must transfer to me 25 percent 
of its ordinary shares” (LAW9). A further two lawyers did not request the shares as a remedy 
but discussed the shares in the “any other comments” box. One lawyer suggested it as an 
interim remedy while finance was arranged to repay the debt and the other lawyer said that 
the shares would not be claimed because “Accepting shares in lieu of debt would be a recipe 
for disaster in view of the personal dynamics”. 
In contrast, only 18.4 percent (n = 7) of laypeople made a request for shares as a 
remedy. Of those seven, only three made a direct request for a share transfer, for example: “I 
want to be listed as 25 percent shareholder in [the Company] as agreed” (LAY25). A further 
four laypeople made some reference to the shares but expressed ambivalence about whether 
or not they wanted a share transfer. Their responses disclosed uncertainty about the 
implications of being a shareholder: 
I want the 25% shares in Amy's company that she promised me, but only if it will 
make me some money and not cause me any risk (LAY2) 
I have no interest in being part of the business as I do not understand how business or 
shareholder status works. (LAY24)  
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I want a 25% shareholding in the company as agreed. I do not want to be involved in 
the day to day running (LAY31) 
Six other laypeople mentioned the shares in the final screen of the MOC which 
asked for “any other comments”. These participants did not ask for the shares to be 
transferred but noted the failure to transfer the shares as promised. We can infer that they 
thought the information was important enough to mention but were not sure what action 
could, or should, attach. This example is typical: 
I was told that I would be a shareholder in Amy's company when it was registered as 
a business. Instead Amy and Mark have split the shares 50/50 and I am not listed 
anywhere as a shareholder as I was told (LAY4) 
This analysis, as well as the analysis for selecting parties, suggests laypeople are 
uncertain around issues of corporate identity and liability. There is a significant difference in 
the understanding between laypeople and lawyers about how corporations operate, the role of 
shareholders, and remedies against a company. This suggests that a large number of 
claimants (in this study, a quarter of the laypeople) would need some support and explanation 
to be able to claim a remedy of this nature against a company (see also Moorhead and Sefton 
2005, 155).  
OVERALL QUALITY OF CLAIMS – LAY VERSUS LAWYER 
We asked the judicial reviewers to grade a subset of claims on a five-point Likert 
scale from “Poor” (1) to “Excellent” (5). There were 12 claims in the subset, five filed by 
lawyers and seven by laypeople, but we did not tell the reviewers that. The literature tells us 
that judges are likely to be biased against laypeople’s claims, so it was important they were 
blinded (Quintanilla, Allen, and Hirt 2017).  
 
 35 
We averaged the scores given for each claim by the four different judges to arrive 
at an overall score for each claim. The average scores for each claim assessed and the judges’ 
assessment as to whether it was prepared by a layperson or lawyer are presented in Table 5.  
The claims actually completed by lawyers gained a higher average score (3.55/5; range of 
averaged scores 3-4) than those actually completed by laypeople (3.05/5; range of averaged 
scores 2.1-3.75). This again supports the finding that there is an overlap at the middle where 
laypeople’s claims are of similar quality to lawyers. In general, however, lawyers have 
somewhat higher overall performance and laypeople have somewhat lower overall 
performance.  
The review by the judges, however, also highlighted a point which often 
confounds general discussions about the relative skill of laypeople compared to lawyers: 
there are some laypeople who can claim very proficiently and there are some lawyers, despite 
being qualified and experienced, who are inept. We asked the judges to say whether they 
thought each claim was filed by a lawyer or a layperson. Notably, the layperson with the 
highest score (3.75) was misidentified by all of the judges as being a lawyer. The judges 
commented that this claim was “free of irrelevancy”, “direct sufficient and to the point”, and 
“succinct pleading which includes all the elements necessary to establish legal liability”. The 
lawyer with the lowest score (3) was misidentified by all but one judge as being a layperson. 
The judge who did identify the person as a lawyer referred to the claimant’s use of legal 
terminology such as “respondent” and “writ” to make the identification, not any qualities in 
the pleading. The judges were all critical of the pleading calling it “full of unnecessary and 
unhelpful details of no probative value”, “too long”, “full of irrelevant material”, and using 
“unnecessarily emotive language”. One of the judges noted “I hope it was not a lawyer”. It 
was, in fact, a lawyer who had more than 10 years’ experience.  
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While laypeople’s work is often critiqued as defective, this research provides 
evidence that while most lawyers perform their work well, and some exceptionally well, there 
is a tail-end who perform poorly. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Competent legal storytelling requires mastery of an entirely different register 
from lay storytelling. Lawyers are trained to tell legal stories, but as the costs of participating 
in litigation have continued to increase, governments and the judiciary have sought more 
cost-effective alternatives, such as user-friendly online portals, where self-represented 
litigants can prepare and file their own dispute. This project used a laboratory experiment to 
test the assumption that laypeople can select out the law-relevant information and input it into 
an online portal.  
Although a small number of laypeople perform the task very well, most were not 
as proficient at legal storytelling as lawyers, even with the support of a user-friendly portal. 
Laypeople omitted more legally salient details than lawyers. Some laypeople filed claims that 
were too brief to provide sufficient detail. Yet greater word count did not necessarily 
correlate to an increase in relevant detail. The concept of corporate liability also caused 
confusion with a group of the laypeople.  
Where laypeople did provide the legally relevant information, it was not always 
clearly articulated. The way some claims were explained was confusing and gave rise to other 
questions that would need to be answered. Where these defects occur, it falls to someone else 
to ask the right follow-up questions or to draw inferences from the information provided. 
Sometimes the information was clear on its face, but was not strategically deployed. This 




For those who use online court system to have access to substantive justice, most 
will need help to transform their problem into a legal narrative that can be adjudicated. How 
best to provide that assistance? We consider four possibilities: more lawyers, more 
inquisitorial judges, help from an intermediary, and improving the portal interface.  
More lawyers and more inquisitorial judges 
The major problem with the solution of using more lawyers is the expense. Legal 
fees are an enormous barrier to access the courts and self-help solutions are specifically 
designed to avoid this cost. Similarly, governments who see online solutions for their cost 
saving benefits are unlikely to be interested in paying or more judges, one of the most 
expensive parts of a court system. Judges performing the role of helping litigants shape their 
dispute narrative is also challenging in countries with an adversarial model (Moorhead 2007, 
Zuckerman 2014).  
Apart from expense, our research suggests lawyers may not always be the best 
solution. We found evidence that some lawyers perform well below the level expected of a 
trained professional; in fact, some lawyers were outperformed by laypeople. Furthermore, the 
research also provides support for the idea that some lawyers’ approach to dispute resolution 
can complicate cases. Lawyers claiming against the Company or suggesting a constructive 
trust argument, showed a willingness to engage in a complex argument for a case where the 
maximum recovery was approximately USD $17,500. Simply providing lawyers is not 
necessarily the answer to assisting access to justice. It depends on the quality of the lawyer 
and on their approach to claiming. 
Help from an intermediary 
Online forms tend to provide structure to elicit details about the parties, but they 
offer only vague encouragement along the lines of “describe the dispute” to elicit a narrative 
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of the dispute. We found not all laypeople could perform this task, with participants 
providing incomplete and unclear information. An intermediary who could elicit further 
information and clarify unclear statements could be provided to read the dispute description 
and interview the litigant (see Zorza 2002 who made suggestions along similar lines although 
perhaps over estimated the ability of people to narrate a dispute). This would be, however, 
very resource intensive and it would require a new class of legal actor who would need to 
have their own set of ethics and skills. While it might ultimately save both on the provision of 
legal services and on the need for judicial intervention, governments will be reluctant to 
invest in a class of intermediaries to provide the assistance laypeople need to shape a lay 
narrative into a legal one. We think it is much more likely that the provision of user-friendly 
portals will be seen as providing access to justice, where access to justice is synonymous with 
direct access without the expense of a lawyer. Attention, therefore, needs to be directed at 
improving the interface so that it not only creates a satisfying user-experience, but it also 
elicits law-relevant facts.  
Improving the technology 
One way to achieve this could be through greater use of “nudges,” which Cass 
Sunstein (2014) defines as “liberty-preserving approaches that steer people in particular 
directions, but that also allow them to go their own way.” Within a court portal, it is possible 
to intentionally (as well as unintentionally) build in nudges to encourage claimants to provide 
the type of information a court needs. The interface could, for example, encourage the 
claimant to not be overly brief by saying “claimants usually write at least 200 words in this 
section”. This might encourage those claimants who were excessively brief to write more and 
therefore include more legally salient facts.  
The architecture of the portal could also provide more structure to elicit legally 
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salient information. Since chronology is important in legal reasoning, providing the 
functionality to arrange facts that have been inputted by date order could help a claimant 
restructure their free narrative into a more law-friendly format. This would then allow the 
claimant, opposing party, and adjudicator, to draw inferences from the ordering. 
Improving the technology also means using methods that go beyond the user-
needs (the concern of design-thinking and user-testing methods). Consideration of how the 
portal supports the inputting of accurately stated, law-relevant facts is also important so that 
we can understand if the technology supports this aspect of access to justice. Future testing of 
online courts needs to use a variety of methods to ensure that there is robust evidence that it 
can genuinely achieve access to justice. 
Limitations and future directions 
A number of factors could limit the validity of our findings in the civil justice 
setting. For example, it was not possible to create a laboratory scenario that would allow the 
participants to have a first-person experience of the dispute. Instead, the participants were 
required to play the role of the ‘lay assistant’. There is a risk that we have not captured the 
way laypeople would explain a first-person narrative; for example, we might have 
underestimated the use of prolix or discursive writing techniques, because the lay participants 
were not emotionally connected with the dispute. Further, people who volunteered for a study 
advertised as an “online court” were likely to be people who are comfortable using a 
computer and communicating in English. In reality, people will have additional barriers to 
being able to file a case online including access to technology and English literacy.   
It is possible that we have overestimated inclusion of relevant information in the 
claim, because participants presumed they needed to include as much of the provided 
information as possible primarily because it had been given to them; not because they 
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deemed it relevant. This finding has been observed in other experimental studies, which has 
shown that participants include irrelevant information solely because they assume it has been 
given with good cause (Hornikx and Hahn 2012). This effect is likely to be more profound 
with the laypeople who are less likely to be familiar with using fact patterns as a basis from 
which to construct and communicate an argument – as opposed to lawyers who were trained 
and assessed at law school in this way. It is reasonable to assume that the differences between 
laypeople and lawyers will be even more pronounced in real world disputes. 
We expect that reasons will be sought to disbelieve the findings that some of the 
lawyers filed poor claims. We were careful to include only experienced lawyers so that the 
results could not be explained by differences in experience. It is possible that lawyers took 
less care than they would with a real claim because they knew they were in a laboratory 
setting. We did, however, tell people that the purpose of the experiment was to compare lay 
and legal claiming.  
The care we took in ensuring only experienced lawyers took part compounded the 
difficulty of recruiting lawyers (many offered up their juniors, an offer we refused) and this 
limited our sample size. We hope other authors will build on the method we have developed 
here and that with larger sample sizes, more detailed analysis of a number of variables can be 
carried out. This could include developing further aspects to the experiment such as asking 
laypeople and lawyers for their reasons about what they included or omitted and testing 
problems with different levels of complexity. It could also include testing whether or not 
giving people general or situation specific legal information about their problem (such as the 
“Solutions Explorer” provides in the CRT) improves the quality of the claim that is 
subsequently entered.  
Notwithstanding the necessary caveats inherent to laboratory-based research on real-world 
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issues, the findings raise a number of lessons for the design of online court forms, and for 
thinking about laypeople’s engagement with the justice system. 
CONCLUSION 
This study used a novel method  of court research to explore the extent to which a 
user-friendly portal supports litigants to input law relevant facts in a dispute. We suggest that 
using this method could compliment research on online courts. In particular, it is a means of 
looking beyond subjective user experiences to whether a portal is enabling access to an 
effective hearing and to a decision in accordance with substantive law. As the global 
pandemic accelerates the move to online courts, we need to continue to develop robust 
methods to ensure that this alluring form of court participation also meets the core principles 
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Figure 1. Comment box for Judicial Participants 
 
Figure 2. Number of words participants require to articulate claim as a function of the 

















Table 1. Summary of Participant Demographics 
 Lay Participants  Lawyer Participants 
Number of participants 38 29 
Age range 18-65 years or older 25-64 years old 
Gender   
Male 12 13 
Female 26 16 
Ethnicity    
NZ European 33 27 
Māori 5 2 
Chinese 1 0 
Other 3 2 
Legal work type   
Employee in a law firm - 15 
Barrister sole - 5 
In-house (general counsel) - 3 
Partner - 2 
Other  - 4 
Post-qualification experience   
3-9 years (even distribution) - 13 





Table 2. Summary of Loan One and Two Dispute Details 




1 Identify the sum loaned: $20,000 
Agreement 3 Identify the form of the agreement: written, 
witnessed, and date. 
Repayment Conditions 8 Identify the repayment details: sum, break fee 
sum, overall total, conditions of repayment. 
Transfer of funds  3 Identify the type of transfer: bank transfer, 
account name, date 
Breach of contract  2 Identify the type of breach: no payment and 
date 
Total Details: 17  
Maximum Score: 34  
Loan Two  
Loan Value 
 
1 Identify the sum loaned: $5,500 
Agreement 5 Identify form of the agreement: verbal and 
date, confirmation by text message and date. 
Repayment Conditions 7 Identify the repayment details: sum, interest 
sum, overall total, conditions of repayment. 
Transfer of funds  3 Identify the type of transfer: bank transfer, 
account name, date 
Breach of contract  2 Identify the type of breach: no payment and 
date 
Total Details: 18  
Maximum Score: 36  
Total Maximum Score: 70  
 
Table 3. Percentage of Laypeople and Lawyers who named Amy, Mark and the Company as a 
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party to the proceeding. 
 Amy Mark Company 
Laypeople 100.0% 26.3% 31.6% 
Lawyers 100.0% 13.8% 65.5% 
 
Table 4. The Median Number (95% CI) of Legally-Relevant Details Reported for Loan One 
and Two, for Laypeople and Lawyers 
  Median 95% CI for Median 
Loan One Laypeople 16.00 14.00 – 18.00 
 Lawyers 24.00 19.00 – 28.00  
Loan Two Laypeople 12.00 9.00 – 13.00  
 Lawyers 20.00 16.00 – 23.00  
 




Scores Number of 
Judges (out of 4) 
correctly 
identified it was 
completed by a 
lay person  
Participant 
Code 
Scores Number of 




by a lawyer 
LAY24 2,2,2,3 4 LAW28 1,3,4,4 1 
LAY16 1,3,3,4 3 LAW21 1,4,4,5 2 
LAY34 3,3,3,3 3 LAW23 3,3,4,4 4 
LAY14 1,3,3,5 4 LAW13 3,4,4,4 2 
LAY30 3,3,3,4 4 LAW2 3,4,4,5 4 
LAY25 2,4,4,4 3   
 
LAY1 3,4,4,4 0 















1 Note that the MOC did not include the functionality of the Solution Explorer which is a feature of the CRT, 
where applicants are provided with legal information and an opportunity to use templates to generate letters and 
find a private resolution. The basic structure of the MOC, where the participants explained their dispute to the 
CRT, was the same. 
2 7.2% of the scores had a Cohen’s κ value of 0.4 to 0.6. While Landis and Koch (1977) propose that is indicative 
of moderate agreement, and that approach that is widely used, we note that there is ongoing discussion as to the 
interpretation of intermediate values and acceptable levels of inter-rater reliability (see Stemler and Tsai 2008, 
McHugh 2012). 
 
